Dominik Peters, Bernina Express train, August 2022

I work on computational social choice, studying voting rules and preference aggregation, and designing fair algorithms. My main focus is on designing decision procedures that satisfy proportionality, where each voter has equal influence on the outcome. In particular, I'm interested in how organisations can decide how to divide their budgets among competing projects using proportional voting rules. I also enjoy proving impossibility theorems in voting theory using computer-aided methods involving SAT solvers.

2022– 🇫🇷 CNRS
2021–22 🇨🇦 Postdoc with Nisarg Shah at the University of Toronto
2020–21 🇺🇸 Postdoc with Ariel Procaccia at Harvard University
2019–20 🇺🇸 Postdoc with Ariel Procaccia at Carnegie Mellon University
2015–19 🇬🇧 DPhil in Computer Science at the University of Oxford, advised by Edith Elkind, at Balliol College
2011–15 🇬🇧 Undergraduate student of Maths & Computer Science at St. John's College, Oxford
1992–11 🇩🇪 Originally from Barsbüttel, close to Hamburg
Screenshot of equalshares.net

On equalshares.net, we present the Method of Equal Shares for Participatory Budgeting. It is a fairer voting method to collectively decide how to use a common budget. The website explains the method and its benefits over other methods, and gives detailed discussions of how to implement it in practice. The website is available in English, German, French, and Polish.

PhD student: Théo Delemazure.
Other websites and projects:
Lecture slides:
News:

Survey

  • Preference Restrictions in Computational Social Choice: A Survey.
    Edith Elkind, Martin Lackner, and Dominik Peters. Manuscript, 116 pages, May 2022.
    PDF · arXiv

2024

  1. Designing Digital Voting Systems for Citizens: Achieving Fairness and Legitimacy in Participatory Budgeting.
    Joshua C. Yang, Carina I. Hausladen, Dominik Peters, Evangelos Pournaras, Regula Häenggli Fricker, Dirk Helbing. ACM Digital Government: Research and Practice, Special Issue on Smart Government Development and Applications, accepted April 2024.
    PDF · Journal · arXiv · Data
  2. In This Apportionment Lottery, the House Always Wins.
    Paul Gölz, Dominik Peters, and Ariel D. Procaccia. Operations Research, accepted April 2024.
    PDF · arXiv
  3. Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in Voting.
    Soroush Ebadian, Anson Kahng, Dominik Peters, and Nisarg Shah. ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, 12 (1).
    PDF · Journal · EC Proceedings Version · arXiv · Poster
  4. Proportional Representation for Artificial Intelligence.
    Dominik Peters. In ECAI '24, Frontiers in AI series, invited contribution.
    PDF
  5. Generalizing Instant Runoff Voting to Allow Indifferences.
    Théo Delemazure and Dominik Peters. In EC '24.
    PDF · arXiv · Slides · Slides EC
  6. The Squared Kemeny Rule for Averaging Rankings.
    Patrick Lederer, Dominik Peters, and Tomasz Wąs. In EC '24.
    PDF · arXiv · Slides
  7. Comparing Ways of Obtaining Candidate Orderings from Approval Ballots.
    Théo Delemazure, Chris Dong, Dominik Peters, Magdaléna Tydrichová. In IJCAI '24.
    PDF · arXiv · Code
  8. Evaluation of Project Performance in Participatory Budgeting.
    Niclas Boehmer, Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Dominik Peters, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Šimon Schierreich, Piotr Skowron, and Stanisław Szufa. In IJCAI '24.
    PDF · arXiv
  9. Proportional Aggregation of Preferences for Sequential Decision Making.
    Nikhil Chandak, Shashwat Goel, and Dominik Peters. In AAAI '24. Outstanding Paper Award.
    PDF · arXiv · Proceedings Version · Political Data Set

2023

  1. Portioning using Ordinal Preferences: Fairness and Efficiency.
    Stéphane Airiau, Haris Aziz, Ioannis Caragiannis, Justin Kruger, Jérôme Lang, and Dominik Peters. Artificial Intelligence (AIJ), 2023, 103809.
    PDF · Journal
  2. Participatory Budgeting: Data, Tools, and Analysis.
    Piotr Faliszewski, Jarosław Flis, Dominik Peters, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Piotr Skowron, Dariusz Stolicki, Stanisław Szufa, and Nimrod Talmon. In IJCAI '23.
    PDF (large file) · arXiv
  3. Rank Aggregation Using Scoring Rules.
    Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, and Dominik Peters. In AAAI '23.
    PDF · arXiv · Proceedings Version · Poster · Code · Slides

2022

  1. Approval Voting under Dichotomous Preferences: A Catalogue of Characterizations.
    Florian Brandl and Dominik Peters. Journal of Economic Theory, 2022, 105532.
    PDF · Journal
  2. Approval-Based Apportionment.
    Markus Brill, Paul Gölz, Dominik Peters, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, and Kai-Henning Wilker. Mathematical Programming, Series B, Special Issue on Mathematical Optimization and Fair Social Decisions, 2022.
    PDF · Journal · arXiv
  3. Almost Envy-Free Allocations with Connected Bundles.
    Vittorio Bilò, Ioannis Caragiannis, Michele Flammini, Ayumi Igarashi, Gianpiero Monaco, Dominik Peters, Cosimo Vinci, and William S. Zwicker. Games and Economic Behavior, 131:197–221, 2022.
    PDF · Journal · arXiv
  4. Preferences Single-Peaked on a Tree: Multiwinner Elections and Structural Results.
    Dominik Peters, Lan Yu, Hau Chan, and Edith Elkind. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 73:231–276.
    PDF · Journal · arXiv
  5. Robust Rent Division.
    Dominik Peters, Ariel D. Procaccia, and David Zhu. NeurIPS '22.
    PDF · Demo
  6. Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in Voting.
    Soroush Ebadian, Anson Kahng, Dominik Peters, and Nisarg Shah. EC '22.
    PDF · Proceedings Version · arXiv · Poster · see also journal version above
  7. In This Apportionment Lottery, the House Always Wins.
    Paul Gölz, Dominik Peters, and Ariel D. Procaccia. EC '22.
    PDF · arXiv · see also journal version above
  8. How to Fairly Allocate Easy and Difficult Chores.
    Soroush Ebadian, Dominik Peters, and Nisarg Shah. AAMAS '22.
    PDF · Proceedings Version · arXiv

2021

  1. Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals.
    Rupert Freeman, David M. Pennock, Dominik Peters, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. Journal of Economic Theory, Vol 193, 2021.
    PDF · Journal · Sci-Hub · arXiv · Demo
  2. Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product Rule.
    Felix Brandt, Florian Brandl, Matthias Greger, Dominik Peters, Christian Stricker, and Warut Suksompong. In WINE '21. Best Student Paper Award.
    PDF (Abstract) · Journal · see also journal version above
  3. Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilities.
    Dominik Peters, Grzegorz Pierczyński, and Piotr Skowron. In NeurIPS '21.
    PDF (Updated October 2022) · Proceedings version · arXiv
  4. Distribution Rules Under Dichotomous Preferences: Two Out of Three Ain't Bad.
    Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Dominik Peters, and Christian Stricker. In EC '21.
    PDF · Slides
  5. Preference Elicitation as Average-Case Sorting.
    Dominik Peters and Ariel D. Procaccia. In AAAI '21.
    PDF
  6. Market-Based Explanations of Collective Decisions.
    Dominik Peters, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Nisarg Shah, and Piotr Skowron. In AAAI '21.
    PDF
  7. Aggregating Binary Judgments Ranked By Accuracy.
    Daniel Halpern, Gregory Kehne, Dominik Peters, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah, and Piotr Skowron. In AAAI '21.
    PDF
  8. District-Fair Participatory Budgeting.
    D. Ellis Hershkowitz, Anson Kahng, Dominik Peters, and Ariel D. Procaccia. In AAAI '21.
    PDF · arXiv

2020

  1. Preferences Single-Peaked on a Circle.
    Dominik Peters and Martin Lackner. In Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 68:463–502, 2020.
    PDF · Journal
  2. Axioms for Learning from Pairwise Comparisons.
    Ritesh Noothigattu, Dominik Peters, and Ariel D. Procaccia. In NeurIPS '20.
    PDF
  3. Explainable Voting.
    Dominik Peters, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alexandros Psomas, and Zixin Zhou. In NeurIPS '20.
    PDF
  4. Proportionality and the Limits of Welfarism.
    Dominik Peters and Piotr Skowron. In EC '20.
    PDF (Updated October 2022) · arXiv
  5. Approval-Based Apportionment.
    Markus Brill, Paul Gölz, Dominik Peters, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, and Kai-Henning Wilker. In AAAI '20.
    PDF · arXiv · see also journal version above
  6. Preventing Arbitrage from Collusion When Eliciting Probabilities.
    Rupert Freeman, David M. Pennock, Dominik Peters, and Bo Waggoner. In AAAI '20.
    PDF · Full version · Poster · Slides
  7. Price of Fairness in Budget Division and Probabilistic Social Choice.
    Marcin Michorzewski, Dominik Peters, and Piotr Skowron. In AAAI '20.
    PDF · Poster

Thesis 🎓

2019

  1. Economic Design for Effective Altruism.
    Dominik Peters. Chapter for The Future of Economic Design.
    PDF
  2. k-Majority Digraphs and the Hardness of Voting with a Constant Number of Voters.
    Georg Bachmeier, Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Paul Harrenstein, Keyvan Kardel, Dominik Peters, and Hans Georg Seedig. In Journal of Computer and System Sciences 105:130-157, 2019.
    PDF · Journal · Sci-Hub · arXiv · Poster
  3. Fractional Hedonic Games.
    Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein, Martin Olsen, and Dominik Peters. In ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 7(2):6:1-6:29, 2019.
    PDF · Journal · Sci-Hub · arXiv
  4. An Axiomatic Characterization of the Borda Mean Rule.
    Florian Brandl and Dominik Peters. In Social Choice and Welfare 52(4):685–707, 2019.
    PDF · Journal
  5. Portioning using Ordinal Preferences: Fairness and Efficiency.
    Stéphane Airiau, Haris Aziz, Ioannis Caragiannis, Justin Kruger, Jérôme Lang, and Dominik Peters. In IJCAI '19.
    PDF · see also journal version above
  6. Correlating Preferences and Attributes: Nearly Single-Crossing Profiles.
    Foram Lakhani, Dominik Peters, and Edith Elkind. In IJCAI '19.
    PDF · Full Version
  7. Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals.
    Rupert Freeman, David M. Pennock, Dominik Peters, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. In EC '19.
    PDF · arXiv · Demo · see also journal version above
  8. Single Transferable Vote: Incomplete Knowledge and Communication Issues.
    Manel Ayadi, Nahla Ben Amor, Jérôme Lang, and Dominik Peters. In AAMAS '19.
    PDF
  9. Pareto-Optimal Allocation of Indivisible Goods with Connectivity Constraints.
    Ayumi Igarashi and Dominik Peters. In AAAI '19. Also presented at AI3.
    PDF · arXiv · Conference Version · Slides
  10. Almost Envy-Free Allocations with Connected Bundles.
    Vittorio Bilò, Ioannis Caragiannis, Michele Flammini, Ayumi Igarashi, Gianpiero Monaco, Dominik Peters, Cosimo Vinci, and William S. Zwicker. In ITCS '19.
    PDF · arXiv · Proceedings Version · Slides · see also journal version above

2018

  1. Proportionality and Strategyproofness in Multiwinner Elections.
    Dominik Peters. In AAMAS '18. Also presented at COMSOC '18.
    PDF · Slides · Proceedings Version, see Erratum (2020)
  2. Single-Peakedness and Total Unimodularity: New Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Multi-Winner Elections.
    Dominik Peters. In AAAI '18. Also presented at ADT '17.
    PDF · Slides · arXiv · BibTeX
  3. Effective Heuristics for Committee Scoring Rules.
    Piotr Faliszewski, Martin Lackner, Dominik Peters, and Nimrod Talmon. In AAAI '18.
    PDF
  4. On Recognising Nearly Single-Crossing Preferences.
    Florian Jaeckle, Dominik Peters, and Edith Elkind. In AAAI '18.
    PDF

2017

  1. Computer-aided Methods for Social Choice Theory.
    Christian Geist and Dominik Peters. Chapter 13 in Trends in Computational Social Choice.
    PDF
  2. Structured Preferences.
    Edith Elkind, Martin Lackner, and Dominik Peters. Chapter 10 in Trends in Computational Social Choice.
    PDF
  3. Optimal Bounds for the No-Show Paradox via SAT Solving.
    Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, and Dominik Peters. In Mathematical Social Sciences 90:18–27, 2017.
    PDF · Journal · arXiv · Replication Data · I recommend my thesis version with an improved proof
  4. Condorcet's Principle and the Preference Reversal Paradox.
    Dominik Peters. In TARK '17.
    PDF · Slides · BibTeX
  5. Precise Complexity of the Core in Dichotomous and Additive Hedonic Games.
    Dominik Peters. In ADT '17.
    PDF · Slides · arXiv · BibTeX
  6. Fair Division of a Graph.
    Sylvain Bouveret, Katarína Cechlárová, Edith Elkind, Ayumi Igarashi, and Dominik Peters. In IJCAI '17.
    PDF · arXiv · BibTeX
  7. Proportional Rankings.
    Piotr Skowron, Martin Lackner, Markus Brill, Dominik Peters, and Edith Elkind. In IJCAI '17.
    PDF · arXiv · BibTeX
  8. Preferences Single-Peaked on a Circle.
    Dominik Peters and Martin Lackner. In AAAI '17.
    PDF · Poster · see also journal version above
  9. Group Activity Selection on Social Networks.
    Ayumi Igarashi, Dominik Peters, and Edith Elkind. In AAAI '17.
    PDF · arXiv · Draft of journal version
  10. Recognising Multidimensional Euclidean Preferences.
    Dominik Peters. In AAAI '17 and COMSOC '16.
    PDF · AAAI version · Slides · arXiv · BibTeX

2016

  1. Preference Restrictions in Computational Social Choice: Recent Progress.
    Edith Elkind, Martin Lackner, and Dominik Peters. In IJCAI '16 (Early Career Spotlight Track).
    PDF · BibTeX
  2. Interdependent Scheduling Games.
    A. Abeliuk, H. Aziz, G. Berbeglia, S. Gaspers, J. Gudmundsson, P. Stursberg, P. Kalina, N. Mattei, D. Peters, P. Van Hentenryck, T. Walsh. In IJCAI '16.
    PDF · arXiv · BibTeX
  3. Optimal Bounds for the No-Show Paradox via SAT Solving.
    Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, and Dominik Peters. In AAMAS '16 (Nominated for Best Paper Award).
    PDF · see also journal version · see also thesis version
  4. Preferences Single-Peaked on Nice Trees.
    Dominik Peters and Edith Elkind. In AAAI '16.
    PDF · Poster · see also journal version above
  5. Graphical Hedonic Games of Bounded Treewidth.
    Dominik Peters. In AAAI '16.
    PDF · BibTeX · Erratum: Theorems 5 and 6 are wrong; see ESA 2022 paper.
  6. Complexity of Hedonic Games with Dichotomous Preferences.
    Dominik Peters. In AAAI '16.
    PDF · Poster · BibTeX · Erratum (2022)
  7. Towards Structural Tractability in Hedonic Games. (Student Abstract)
    Dominik Peters. In AAAI '16 Student Abstracts.
    PDF · Poster

2015

  1. Simple Causes of Complexity in Hedonic Games.
    Dominik Peters and Edith Elkind. In IJCAI '15 and CoopMAS '15.
    PDF · Poster · arXiv · BibTeX