Dominik Peters, selfie on train EC 9 near Bremen, April 2019

I work on computational social choice, studying voting rules and preference aggregation, and designing fair algorithms. Recently, I have been interested in how organisations can decide how to divide their budgets among competing projects. I also enjoy proving impossibility theorems in voting theory using computer-aided methods involving SAT solvers.

I did my PhD (DPhil, 2015–19) at the Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, supervised by Edith Elkind, as a member of Balliol College. Previously (2011–15), I was an undergraduate student of Maths & Computer Science at St. John's College, Oxford. I'm originally from Barsbüttel, close to Hamburg.

News. I have moved to Carnegie Mellon University for a postdoc hosted by Ariel Procaccia from July 2019. In May 2019, I submitted my thesis on the Fair Division of the Commons, and defended it in September (pic). 3 papers accepted to AAAI (party-approval, group-proper, price-of-fairness). I just finished a manuscript with Piotr Skowron arguing that Proportional Approval Voting is not proportional.

Thesis 🎓

Updated: 2019-11-26

Recent Papers

Recent Posters

How To Split A Budget Based on Approvals (Poster) Pareto-Optimal Allocation of Indivisible Goods with Connectivity Constraints (Poster) Effective Heuristics for Committee Scoring Rules (Poster) Preferences Single-Peaked on a Circle (Poster) Kemeny is NP-hard for 7 Voters (Poster) Optimal Bounds for the No-Show Paradox via SAT Solving (Poster) Towards Structural Tractability in Hedonic Games (Poster) Preferences Single-Peaked on Nice Trees (Poster) Complexity of Hedonic Games with Dichotomous Preferences (Poster) Simple Causes of Complexity in Hedonic Games (Poster)

Preprints

Book Chapters

  1. Economic Design for Effective Altruism.
    Dominik Peters. Draft Chapter for Future of Economic Design (in preparation).
    PDF
  2. Computer-aided Methods for Social Choice Theory.
    Christian Geist and Dominik Peters. Chapter 13 in Trends in Computational Social Choice.
    PDF
  3. Structured Preferences.
    Edith Elkind, Martin Lackner, and Dominik Peters. Chapter 10 in Trends in Computational Social Choice.
    PDF

Journal Publications

  1. k-Majority Digraphs and the Hardness of Voting with a Constant Number of Voters.
    Georg Bachmeier, Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Paul Harrenstein, Keyvan Kardel, Dominik Peters, and Hans Georg Seedig. In Journal of Computer and System Sciences 105:130-157, 2019.
    PDF · arXiv · Poster
  2. Fractional Hedonic Games.
    Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein, Martin Olsen, Dominik Peters. In ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 7(2):6:1-6:29, 2019.
    PDF · arXiv
  3. An Axiomatic Characterization of the Borda Mean Rule.
    Florian Brandl and Dominik Peters. In Social Choice and Welfare 52(4):685–707, 2019.
    PDF · Journal
  4. Optimal Bounds for the No-Show Paradox via SAT Solving.
    Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, and Dominik Peters. In Mathematical Social Science 90:18–27, 2017.
    PDF · Journal · Poster · arXiv · AAMAS version · Replication Data · BibTeX

Conference Publications

  1. newApproval-Based Apportionment.
    Markus Brill, Paul Gölz, Dominik Peters, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, and Kai-Henning Wilker. In AAAI '20 (accepted).
    PDF
  2. newPreventing Arbitrage from Collusion When Eliciting Probabilities.
    Rupert Freeman, David M. Pennock, Dominik Peters, and Bo Waggoner. In AAAI '20 (accepted).
    PDF · Full version
  3. newPrice of Fairness in Budget Division and Probabilistic Social Choice.
    Marcin Michorzewski, Dominik Peters, and Piotr Skowron. In AAAI '20 (accepted).
    PDF
  4. 2019Portioning using Ordinal Preferences: Fairness and Efficiency.
    Stéphane Airiau, Haris Aziz, Ioannis Caragiannis, Justin Kruger, Jérôme Lang, and Dominik Peters. In IJCAI '19.
    PDF
  5. Correlating Preferences and Attributes: Nearly Single-Crossing Profiles.
    Foram Lakhani, Dominik Peters, and Edith Elkind. In IJCAI '19.
    PDF
  6. Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals.
    Rupert Freeman, David M. Pennock, Dominik Peters, and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. In EC '19.
    PDF · arXiv
  7. Single Transferable Vote: Incomplete Knowledge and Communication Issues.
    Manel Ayadi, Nahla Ben Amor, Jérôme Lang, and Dominik Peters. In AAMAS '19.
    PDF
  8. Pareto-Optimal Allocation of Indivisible Goods with Connectivity Constraints.
    Ayumi Igarashi and Dominik Peters. In AAAI '19. Also presented at AI3.
    PDF · arXiv · Conference Version · Slides
  9. Almost Envy-Free Allocations with Connected Bundles.
    Vittorio Bilò, Ioannis Caragiannis, Michele Flammini, Ayumi Igarashi, Gianpiero Monaco, Dominik Peters, Cosimo Vinci, and William S. Zwicker. In ITCS '19.
    PDF · arXiv · Proceedings Version · Slides
  10. 2018Proportionality and Strategyproofness in Multiwinner Elections.
    Dominik Peters. In AAMAS '18. Also presented at COMSOC '18.
    PDF · Slides
  11. Single-Peakedness and Total Unimodularity: New Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Multi-Winner Elections.
    Dominik Peters. In AAAI '18. Also presented at ADT '17.
    PDF · Slides · arXiv · BibTeX
  12. Effective Heuristics for Committee Scoring Rules.
    Piotr Faliszewski, Martin Lackner, Dominik Peters, and Nimrod Talmon. In AAAI '18.
    PDF
  13. On Recognising Nearly Single-Crossing Preferences.
    Florian Jaeckle, Dominik Peters, and Edith Elkind. In AAAI '18.
    PDF
  14. 2017Condorcet's Principle and the Preference Reversal Paradox.
    Dominik Peters. In TARK '17.
    PDF · Slides · BibTeX
  15. Precise Complexity of the Core in Dichotomous and Additive Hedonic Games.
    Dominik Peters. In ADT '17.
    PDF · Slides · arXiv · BibTeX
  16. Fair Division of a Graph.
    Sylvain Bouveret, Katarína Cechlárová, Edith Elkind, Ayumi Igarashi, and Dominik Peters. In IJCAI '17.
    PDF · arXiv · BibTeX
  17. Proportional Rankings.
    Piotr Skowron, Martin Lackner, Markus Brill, Dominik Peters, and Edith Elkind. In IJCAI '17.
    PDF · arXiv · BibTeX
  18. Preferences Single-Peaked on a Circle.
    Dominik Peters and Martin Lackner. In AAAI '17.
    PDF · Poster · BibTeX
  19. Group Activity Selection on Social Networks.
    Ayumi Igarashi, Dominik Peters, and Edith Elkind. In AAAI '17.
    PDF · arXiv · BibTeX
  20. Recognising Multidimensional Euclidean Preferences.
    Dominik Peters. In AAAI '17 and COMSOC '16.
    PDF · AAAI version · Slides · arXiv · BibTeX
  21. 2016Preference Restrictions in Computational Social Choice: Recent Progress.
    Edith Elkind, Martin Lackner, and Dominik Peters. In IJCAI '16 (Early Career Spotlight Track).
    PDF · BibTeX
  22. Interdependent Scheduling Games.
    A. Abeliuk, H. Aziz, G. Berbeglia, S. Gaspers, J. Gudmundsson, P. Stursberg, P. Kalina, N. Mattei, D. Peters, P. Van Hentenryck, T. Walsh. In IJCAI '16.
    PDF · arXiv · BibTeX
  23. Optimal Bounds for the No-Show Paradox via SAT Solving.
    Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, and Dominik Peters. In AAMAS '16 (Nominated for Best Paper Award).
    PDF · also see journal version above
  24. Preferences Single-Peaked on Nice Trees.
    Dominik Peters and Edith Elkind. In AAAI '16.
    PDF · Poster · BibTeX
  25. Graphical Hedonic Games of Bounded Treewidth.
    Dominik Peters. In AAAI '16.
    PDF · BibTeX
  26. Complexity of Hedonic Games with Dichotomous Preferences.
    Dominik Peters. In AAAI '16.
    PDF · Poster · BibTeX
  27. Towards Structural Tractability in Hedonic Games. (Student Abstract)
    Dominik Peters. In AAAI '16 Student Abstracts.
    PDF · Poster
  28. 2015Simple Causes of Complexity in Hedonic Games.
    Dominik Peters and Edith Elkind. In IJCAI '15 and CoopMAS '15.
    PDF · Poster · arXiv · BibTeX